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AGAINST SETTLEMENT? OWEN FISS, ADRAND
AUSTRALIAN DISCRIMINATION LAW
DOMINIQUEALLEN
School of Law, Deakin University, Melbourne
ABSTRACT
In his celebrated article, Against Settlement, Owen Fiss objected to settlement for,
among other things, securing the peace while not necessarily delivering justice and
denying the court the opportunity to interpret the law. Fiss sees settlement as a tech-
nique for streamlining court dockets, the civil equivalent of plea bargaining. This
article explores Fiss’s criticisms through the lens of resolving discrimination
complaints in Australia. It argues that although it is valuable to offer complainants
a system for resolving complaints quickly and informally, especially in a jurisdic-
tion in which complainants are often from marginalised groups, it is also necessary
to recognise that this system is limited in how effectively it can develop the law
and, by extension, eradicate discrimination. In essence, the system’s operation epit-
omises Fiss’ opposition to settlement. Modifying the complaint resolution system
would improve this situation. The article concludes by proposing three reforms
based on mechanisms used in comparable countries: introducing direct access to
the court or tribunal; strengthening ADR by making it voluntary and incorporating
a ‘rights-based’ approach; and encouraging the regular publication of specific infor-
mation about settlements and significant cases.
INTRODUCTION
In his seminal article in 1984, Owen Fiss explained why he is against
settlement:
To be against settlement is only to suggest that when the parties settle,
society gets less than what appears, and for a price it does not know it is
paying. Parties might settle while leaving justice undone. (Fiss, 1984:
1085)
This article contends that Fiss’s concern has been realised in the devel-
opment of anti-discrimination law inAustralia. The process of resolving
a discrimination complaint is as follows: a victim of discrimination is
required to lodge a complaint at the statutory Equality Commission1 in
their jurisdiction. If the Commission accepts the complaint, it will attempt
to settle it, usually through a confidential conciliation process. If that is
unsuccessful, the complainant may then ask the Equality Commission to
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refer the complaint to court2 for adjudication. The complaint may then
undergo court ordered mediation, which is also confidential, adding
another layer of secrecy to the process. Each year, very few discrimina-
tion cases reach the stage of a final hearing; the overwhelming majority
are settled or withdrawn prior to hearing. The result is that although
Australian law has prohibited discrimination for over 30 years, the body
of case law remains small. Due to the confidential nature of the complaint
resolution process, other victims are limited in their ability to exercise
their rights.
After considering the process of resolving discrimination
complaints in Australia, Part I explores the benefits and drawbacks of
using Alternative Dispute Resolution (“ADR”) in this setting. It argues
that although it is valuable to offer parties a system to resolve the
complaint quickly and cost-effectively, especially in an area in which
complainants are often the most vulnerable members of society, it is also
necessary to recognise that this system is limited in facilitating legal
development and, by extension, eradicating discrimination. As Part II
explores, in essence, the system’s operation epitomises Fiss’s opposition
to settlement. It is not suggested that parties to discrimination complaints
should not be given the opportunity to resolve their complaint outside of
a court hearing. The central thesis of this article is that the system typi-
fies Fiss’s concerns about settlement and for that reason, it should be
modified.ADR is incorporated in the revisions that this article proposes.
Introducing small changes to the enforcement model would improve
the situation. Part III considers mechanisms used in the United States of
America, Britain, Northern Ireland and Ireland which would overcome
the identified limitations with theAustralian model. It explores the bene-
fits of giving complainants direct access to courts and making ADR
voluntary; the utility of changing the dispute resolution model so that it
is less focused on facilitating a settlement and more ‘rights-based’ and
focused on upholding both the victim’s rights and the legislation’s objec-
tives; and the advantages of requiring the Equality Commissions to
publish more information about settlements, thereby empowering future
complainants and deterring would-be respondents. This analysis also
draws on interviews conducted with scholars, lawyers and staff at the
Equality Commissions in those countries.3
I – USINGADR TO SETTLE DISCRIMINATION COMPLAINTS IN
AUSTRALIA
The Process of Resolving a Discrimination Complaint
In Australia, discrimination is prohibited by federal law and by laws in
each State and Territory on a range of attributes, such as race, sex and
IJDL 10-4 29/11/10 13:53 Page 192
disability, and in various areas such as employment, education and goods
and services. Discrimination complaints are resolved in much the same
way in each jurisdiction. A person who has experienced unlawful
discrimination can lodge a complaint at the statutory Equality
Commission in their state or territory or at the federalAustralian Human
Rights Commission (“AHRC”). The Equality Commission investigates
the complaint and attempts to settle it, usually through conciliation. Most
Acts do not define ‘conciliation’, apart from stating that it will be
conducted in a manner that the person presiding over it sees fit.4 The
exception is the Australian Capital Territory’s legislation which states:
conciliation of a complaint involves the commission acting as an impar-
tial third party to help the parties to the conciliation to endeavour to resolve
the matters raised by the complaint.5
Similarly, the NationalAlternative Dispute ResolutionAdvisory Council
defines ‘conciliation’ as:
a process in which the participants, with the assistance of the dispute reso-
lution practitioner (the conciliator), identify the issues in dispute, develop
options, consider alternatives and endeavour to reach an agreement.6
TheAHRC’s approach fits with this definition. According to its website,
conciliation is informal and flexible.7 The role of the Conciliator is to
help “both sides talk about the issues in the complaint and makes sure
that the process is as fair as possible for everyone involved.”8
Conciliators are impartial and do not provide legal advice. Their role is
to “assist the parties to consider different options to resolve the complaint
and provide information about possible terms of settlement.”9 Ronalds
says that the nature of conciliation varies between complaints.
Conciliation may involve a face-to-face meeting between the parties. In
other instances, the parties may be in different rooms and the Conciliator
will move between the two groups to convey offers and counter offers.
Sometimes geographical locations may prevent the parties frommeeting,
so the conciliation may be conducted by phone or through an exchange
of letters (2008: 178).10
The only legislative requirements for the conduct of conciliation are
that it is held in private11 and evidence of anything said during the concil-
iation is not admissible in court proceedings.12 Most legislation permits
the parties to be represented,13 although some require the party to seek
leave prior to the conciliation.14 The Equality Commissions also publish
information about the conciliation process on their websites to help the
parties to prepare.15 However, the Equality Commissions do not publish
the facts or outcomes of the complaints that are resolved at this stage,
even in a de-identified form. Some publish examples of settlements on
their websites or in their annual reports (Allen, 2009: 781) but generally,
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the Equality Commissions are reluctant to disclose such information,
even for research purposes.16
If the parties do not settle through conciliation, the complainant
can ask the Equality Commission to refer the complaint to the tribunal.
The complaint may be subject to mediation17 before proceeding to a full
hearing before a civil tribunal or the Federal Court. There are two differ-
ences between conciliation by the Equality Commission and mediation
by the court or tribunal. First, mediation occurs as part of the court’s
case management procedures to reduce its workload so the purpose is to
avoid a hearing. By contrast, Gonzalez and McCabe identify that the
challenge for Conciliators in the anti-discrimination context is to tailor
their approach to maximise the chances of reaching a resolution while
also ensuring that the conciliation meets the parties’ needs (2003: 4).
The second difference is that the Mediator may be a member of the court
or tribunal,18 so they are experienced at deciding complaints and may
use that experience to guide the parties towards a resolution.
Conciliators are employed by the Equality Commission and tend to take
a ‘hands-off’ approach and facilitate discussion between the parties,
although they also bring expertise to the process through their knowl-
edge of the law and their experience conciliating past complaints (Ball
and Raymond).
All discrimination complaints are dealt with via a single process,
regardless of their urgency or the nature of the discriminatory conduct.19
The system assumes that all complaints are the same and that all of the
parties are in the same situation, so it compels them to participate in
settlement negotiations. The result of this process is that very few
complaints reach the courts each year; the vast majority are settled, with-
drawn or struck out on procedural grounds. Table 1 demonstrates this in
three jurisdictions: Victoria, Queensland and federally.
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Table 1 Complaint Resolution 2006–200720
Victoria Queensland Federal
Discrimination Complaints Received
by the Equality Commission 1550 562 1779
Complaints Referred to Conciliation 37.43% 43221 38%
Complaints Resolved at Conciliation Unknown 60% 69%
Complaints Referred to the Tribunal/
Court 209 110 9822
Complaints Resolved through
Mediation at the Tribunal/ Court 65% 57% Unknown23
Substantive Decisions (2007) 11 9 12
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Advantages and Disadvantages of Using ADR to Settle Discrimination
Complaints
Before considering why Fiss is opposed to settlement generally, it is worth
outlining some of the advantages and disadvantages of using ADR to
resolve a discrimination complaint. The first advantage of ADR is that it
is less intimidating than a court proceeding, which demands, amongst
other formalities, technical hearing and evidential procedures. By contrast,
ADR is suitable for those people who would not pursue a complaint if
they had to participate in a public hearing, perhaps due to the emotional
stress of a trial or their unfamiliarity with court procedures. This is an
important consideration here because discrimination complainants are
likely to be vulnerable or from marginalised groups. A complainant will
be more inclined to obtain legal representation for a court hearing than
for ADR. Thus, the second advantage of ADR is that it increases access
to justice. In the anti-discrimination sphere, ADR is cost-free, unless
parties choose to retain legal representation, and even so, representation
is less expensive than for litigation.24 Third, ADR is quicker and more
expeditious than litigation. For example, in Victoria, once the Equality
Commission accepts a complaint, it has 60 days to attempt to conciliate
it.25 Finally, ADR is more flexible than litigation. The parties control the
outcome, rather having an outcome imposed by a third party. There are no
restrictions on the settlement the parties can agree to. At least theoreti-
cally, the parties determine the terms of settlement.26
Just as there are advantages to using ADR, there are also disad-
vantages. ADR may reinforce the power imbalances between the parties
to the complainant’s detriment (Hunter and Leonard, 1997: 1, n3). The
Conciliator, as an impartial third party to the process, is expected to
address any power imbalances. There is an increased possibility of
power imbalances in a discrimination complaint because the
complainant may from a marginalised group. If the parties are in an
ongoing relationship, such as in an employment related complaint, this
may also create a power imbalance because the complainant may not
want to jeopardise that relationship during conciliation. The power
imbalance is also evident when considering the inequality in access to
legal advice. Complainants are usually not eligible for Legal Aid (Gaze
and Hunter, 2009: 716–718) and the Equality Commission cannot advise
or assist either party to resolve their complaint. While most respondents
have representation,27 in 2008–2009, only 35% of complainants in
federal discrimination matters had some form of representation
(Australian Human Rights Commission, 2008–09: 63). The dynamics of
ADR can change if lawyers are involved. Lawyers may exacerbate
existing power imbalances, particularly if they engage in aggressive,
adversarial behaviour,28 which is contrary to the purpose of an informal
resolution process. The focus of ADR may then shift to arguing the
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merits of the complaint, rather than allowing the parties to reach a
mutual understanding and negotiate a suitable outcome. In that context,
the role of the Conciliator is important because they can minimise the
degree to which the process becomes adversarial and encourage the
parties to take ownership of the outcome, rather than letting the process
develop into a negotiation between the lawyers.
The second disadvantage ofADR is confidentiality.A confidentiality
term is commonly a feature of a settlement agreement in a discrimination
complaint. Ronalds states that this term can be as narrow as the parties
agreeing to keep the terms of settlement private or much wider and
prevent the parties from disclosing that a complaint was made and the
settlement terms (2008: 193). Legislation also requires the conciliation
process to be kept confidential.29 The purpose of confidentiality in this
sense is so that public scrutiny does not obstruct the possibility of a
successful conciliation (Thornton, 1989: 740). Thornton says that without
the protection of confidentiality, respondents would not be prepared to be
labeled as wrongdoers and complainants may be deterred from lodging
a complaint (1989: 740). The problem with confidentiality is that it
restricts the publicly available information about the conciliation process
and settlement outcomes and, in doing so, it masks the extent to which
discrimination remains a problem in society. Confidentiality also means
that later conciliation participants do not have access to information about
the process and possible settlement outcomes which, particularly for an
unrepresented complainant, could put them in a disadvantaged position.
Thornton says that confidentiality contributes to the idea that settlement
outcomes are relevant to the parties only, meaning they cannot be used
as models for others, nor can the complaint be used by groups to lobby
for changes to policy (1989: 741). Thus, confidentiality is substantially
limiting the law’s ‘ripple’ effect.30
Third, there is no guarantee that ADR protects the public’s interest
in eliminating discrimination or that it protects individual rights. This is
more problematic if ADR is used purely as a case management tech-
nique.31 The purpose of mediation at the court or tribunal is to avoid a
hearing.Although conciliation at the Equality Commission has a slightly
different purpose, Hunter and Leonard say that it may not protect the
public’s or the individual’s interest if the Equality Commission perceives
the goal of conciliation to be resolving the complaint quickly and
keeping it away from the courts (1995: 1). At least one Australian
Equality Commission has admitted that this is its intention. The
QueenslandAnti-Discrimination Commission noted that in 2006–2007,
more complaints were resolved at the Commission, meaning less were
referred to the tribunal for hearing, a trend that it intended to maintain
(2006/07: 11).32
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II – FISS’S OPPOSITION TO SETTLEMENT
Fiss published Against Settlement at a time when there was a growing
movement away from litigation towards using other forms of resolution
to settle legal disputes. ADR was intended to reduce the amount of liti-
gation that was commenced and to resolve ongoing litigation.33 Fiss was
concerned about the way advocates of ADR characterised adjudication.
He thought that they viewed it as a process for resolving disputes
between neighbours but failed to recognise that the fact that the neigh-
bours’ relationship has disintegrated in such a way that they have to turn
to a third person to resolve their dispute suggests that they will not be able
to reach a negotiated agreement by themselves (1984: 1075).
Fiss put forward four objections to settlement. First, settlement
assumes the economic and resource equality of the parties; it envisages the
parties as neighbours of roughly equal standing. This is rarely the case
and so the parties’ resource inequality directly influences the negotiation
process (1984: 1076–1077). Second, the settlement model assumes that
the parties are individuals but they are regularly corporations with respon-
sibilities to shareholders, and organisations or groups. In the latter
instance, it is unclear who can speak for or give consent on behalf of the
institution (1984: 1078–1082). Third, the model assumes that settlement
is the end of the story. It overlooks the fact that a court judgement may be
the beginning of a longer process and the court’s role can continue indefi-
nitely (1984: 1082–1085).34 Fiss’s final objection to settlement is that it
may secure the peace but it will not necessarily deliver justice. Fiss sees
settlement as a technique for streamlining court dockets, describing it as
the civil equivalent of plea bargaining (1984: 1075). For Fiss, the purpose
of adjudication is broader than two neighbours turning to the court to
resolve their dispute. It is to achieve justice, which is a public good that
extends beyond the satisfaction of the parties (2009: 1277). He states that
the job of courts is:
To explicate and give force to the values embodied in the authoritative
texts such as the Constitution and statutes: to interpret those values and to
bring reality into accord with them (1984: 1085).
Settlement denies the court the opportunity to interpret the law. For
instance, Fiss says, settling a school desegregation suit may settle the
peace between the parties but it will not deliver racial equality (1984:
1085). Although Fiss does not discuss this, his argument leaves us to
contemplate whether racial integration would have spread beyond
Topeka, Kansas in 1954 if the Supreme Court was denied the opportunity
to rule in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka 347 US 483 (1954).35
It is necessary to explore Fiss’s last criticism in more detail and to show
how it has transpired in the context ofAustralian anti-discrimination law.
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Peace but not Justice
Fiss is critical of settlement because while it may secure the peace
between the parties, it will not necessarily deliver justice. This idea can
be considered first in terms of whether justice is achieved between the
individual parties who settle a discrimination complaint. The
complainant may be inclined to settle due to a range of factors, including
that they are happy with the offer made by the respondent and believe
that justice has been done. However, their reasons for settling may not
be that simple. The parties may settle because of the time and energy it
takes to pursue or defend a complaint, the publicity associated with liti-
gation and the cost.36 In Australia, complainants in discrimination
matters also risk a lower compensation award if they are successful
compared to what they could negotiate at settlement (Allen, 2009: 786–
787). So complainants may not necessarily get justice; they may just
get tired of the dispute.
It is necessary to recall the key limitation in analysing settlement
outcomes in discrimination complaints – very little data is available about
the nature of complaints and the outcomes negotiated, especially in
comparison to other countries (Allen, 2010a).Although the available data
is limited, it does show that most settlements include individualised
remedies, such as compensation, an apology or a reference. Of these,
compensation is by far the most common (Allen, 2009: 790–794). For
example, in 2006–07 in Victoria, compensation was included in more
than 67 percent of settlement agreements (Allen, 2009: Table 4). A
discrimination settlement is a contractual agreement between the parties.
If it is negotiated during conciliation, the Equality Commission may keep
a copy on file37 but they rarely release information about how complaints
are settled38 either in their annual reports or for research purposes.
Consequently, we cannot evaluate whether settlements are upholding the
complainant’s rights.
Another approach for considering whether justice is achieved is in
the context of the wider community, namely whether the law has
achieved its objectives. The purpose of anti-discrimination law is to
address discrimination and promote equality of opportunity.39 This is
achieved by prohibiting a range of conduct and establishing a system
by which victims of unlawful conduct can lodge complaints and obtain
redress. The Equality Commission is charged with educating the
community about their rights and of the consequences of discriminating.
If ‘equality of opportunity’ is taken at its broadest, then the law’s objec-
tive is social change. While it is acknowledged that this system is a
relatively weak method of achieving social change,40 the privatised
conciliation process and the confidentiality of settlement outcomes
compromise it even more. This is exacerbated by the fact that there are
few publicly decided cases each year, as the next section shows. Thus
198
IJDL 10-4 29/11/10 13:53 Page 198
far, the law cannot be considered to be delivering justice to the wider
community.
Limited Opportunities for Courts to Interpret the Law
Fiss is critical of settlement because it means that the court is denied the
opportunity to interpret the law and bring reality into line with what
the law requires. Similarly, Sternlight comments that because anti-
discrimination law is a complex area of law and cases often involve
confusing and contested facts, society needs correct determinations. She
states that society needs “clear and public precedents to deter future
wrongdoers and let persons know what conduct is permissible” (2004:
1477–1478). Recall that in Australia the vast majority of complaints are
settled through confidential conciliation. Of those referred to the court,
most are withdrawn or settled prior to hearing. For instance, in 2007, the
federal courts only heard twelve discrimination cases, the Queensland
Anti-Discrimination Tribunal heard nine and the Victorian Civil and
Administrative Tribunal heard eleven.41 Only five of these 32 decisions
were successful, so the courts had few opportunities to interpret discrim-
ination law. Therefore, the most dramatic way that Australian
anti-discrimination law depicts Fiss’s concerns is the lack of jurispru-
dence that has developed in the 30 years since discrimination was first
prohibited in Australia.42 The High Court has substantively considered
anti-discrimination law on only seven occasions43 and this has not
resulted in a clear body of case law to guide lower courts and tribunals.44
Most of the High Court’s decisions relate to disability discrimination,45
only one relates to race discrimination,46 the Court has never considered
age discrimination and there is only one authoritative decision about the
application of special measures.47A coherent body of jurisprudence from
superior courts in the States and Territories has not filled the gap in
jurisprudence either.
The limited amount of jurisprudence is a considerable problem for
society in general. Anti-discrimination law did not develop from a rich
common law base. It is a relatively new area of law that is statute based.
For its growth and development, the courts are required to render inter-
pretations. Furthermore, court decisions show that discrimination still
exists and that it has consequences. With so few cases coming before the
courts, the Australian community could be forgiven for thinking that
discrimination is no longer a problem. The law’s limited development
is also a problem for those involved in resolving individual complaints.
Staff at the Equality Commissions, who provide information and
educate the community about the law, need clear determinations about
the meaning of discrimination and its consequences. The lack of guid-
ance about how the court will interpret the law is also a problem for the
parties, lawyers and conciliation staff when they are attempting to
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resolve a complaint and it is an ongoing issue for respondents who do
not know what compliance requires, nor is the law serving a deterrent
function.
The picture painted in the preceding section suggests that we should
be against settlement in the context of discrimination complaints due to
the way that it is impeding the law’s development. Encouraging court
decisions – public statements of law that apply universally – is the only
way of repairing this damage. However, tipping the scales in favour of
adjudication is not desirable either;ADR has proliferated due to the prob-
lems with courts including delays, costs, and complex rules and
procedures. So a system that leans towards adjudication may meet
society’s public interest in eliminating discrimination but it will not
necessarily meet the private goals of the parties such as cost, expediency,
addressing the non-legal issues and reaching an appropriate resolution.48
As Luban has argued, taking away ADR as an option would be just as
undesirable as a world without adjudication (1994–1995: 2640–2642).
Commenting on designing a process for resolving employment discrim-
ination complaints, Sternlight says that a single process is unlikely to
work; it is necessary to offer adjudication and ADR (2004: 1490).
Nevertheless, there needs to be a balance. At present, that balance is
tipped in favour of ADR – all complaints are subjected to ADR regard-
less of whether they are ‘run of the mill’ or could potentially set a
precedent. If ADR is to continue to be used to resolve discrimination
complaints, it is essential that every complaint is not channelled into this
forum or the law’s development will remain stunted, thus participating in
ADR should be optional.
III – REFORMING THEAUSTRALIAN SYSTEM
Thornton says that the individual complaints system was introduced in
Australia in the expectation that the resolution of each individual
complaint would have a “positive ripple effect and deter other potential
discriminators” (1995: 83). However, as Parts I and II showed, the way
the system is currently operating, individual complaints can have only a
limited effect on eradicating discrimination. The following problems are
contributing to this: the same process is applied to all complaints, most
notably ADR is not voluntary – parties are required to attempt to settle
before they can litigate; conciliation is facilitative, rather than ‘hands-
on’; and the complaint resolution process is privatised so there is little
publicly available information about settlements and no way for society
to evaluate whether the process is delivering justice. Thus, the system
itself is mitigating the effect an individual complaint can have on other
instances of discrimination by restricting the number of ‘ripples’ gener-
ated in society.
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This section proposes modifications to the complaint resolution
model that would address these problems. It discusses three changes
based on mechanisms used in the United States, Britain, Northern Ireland
and Ireland: direct access to the court or tribunal; voluntary ‘rights-based’
conciliation or adjudication; and increasing the information flow about
the complaint resolution system by encouraging the Equality
Commission and the tribunal to release information about settlements
regularly. Each aspect of this model is discussed in the context of the
country from which it was drawn. Anti-discrimination laws in these
countries are not covered comprehensively. The purpose of this discus-
sion is to provide suggestions for addressing the problems identified with
theAustralian system in the preceding sections, drawing upon the mech-
anisms used in those countries.49
Resolving Discrimination Complaints in the United States, Britain,
Northern Ireland and Ireland
This section presents an overview of the process of resolving an indi-
vidual discrimination complaint in the comparative countries. The
overview highlights the shared characteristics of each country: ADR is
available as an alternative to litigation; attempting to resolve the
complaint through ADR does not preclude litigation; ADR is voluntary
and conducted separately from the Equality Commission; and most of
these countries offer direct access to adjudication.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) is the
federal agency responsible for investigating complaints about employ-
ment discrimination in the United States of America. Before a
complainant can file a lawsuit in federal court, they must file a ‘charge’
with the EEOC. The EEOC investigates each charge, operating as a
neutral fact-finder. Based on this investigation, if the EEOC finds that
there is reasonable cause that discrimination has occurred, it attempts to
resolve the charge by conference, conciliation or persuasion. Since 1999,
the EEOC has offered voluntary mediation, which is conducted sepa-
rately from the Commission. If the parties cannot reach agreement
through a conference, conciliation, persuasion or mediation, the
complainant can litigate. Alternatively, the EEOC may decide to litigate
the charge on the complainant’s behalf.50
In Ireland, complainants have direct access to the Equality Tribunal.
The Equality Tribunal refers complaints to mediation unless one party
objects.51 Otherwise, complaints are resolved through investigation, an
informal hearing process. The Equality Authority is responsible for
assisting complainants and educating the community about the law but
it does not handle or resolve complaints.
There are separate Equality Commissions for Britain and Northern
Ireland: the Equality and Human Rights Commission (“EHRC”) in
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Britain and the Equality Commission for Northern Ireland (“ECNI”).
The complaint resolution process is substantially the same in both juris-
dictions. Complainants have direct access to the Employment Tribunals
and to civil courts for non-employment related complaints. The Equality
Commissions are not responsible for complaint handling or concilia-
tion.52 Parties can choose conciliation for an employment related
complaint. Conciliation is conducted by a government agency – the
Advisory Conciliation andArbitration Service (“ACAS”) in Britain and
the Labour Relations Agency in Northern Ireland. In October 2007, the
three British Equality Commissions – the Commission for Racial
Equality, the Equal Opportunities Commission and the Disability Rights
Commission (“DRC”) – were merged into one body – the EHRC. The
complaint resolution structure was not radically altered. The discussion
of Britain considers conciliation at the DRC. Although this information
is largely historical, it is included because of the Commission’s success
at introducing a ‘rights-based’ form of conciliation, which the new EHRC
later adopted.53
Direct Access to Court
As outlined above, in Australia a victim of discrimination is required to
lodge a complaint at the Equality Commission before they can proceed
to court. No jurisdiction offers direct access to court.54 By contrast, a
complainant can lodge their discrimination complaint at the relevant
tribunal in Britain, Northern Ireland and Ireland. The Equality
Commission is not required to handle the complaint first, nor does it
attempt to resolve it throughADR.55 The opportunity for the complainant
to utilise ADR is not lost: in Britain, the Employment Tribunal automat-
ically sends ACAS a copy of all employment related discrimination
complaints filed at the Tribunal. ACAS has a duty to offer to resolve the
complaint through conciliation. The process at the Labour Relations
Agency in Northern Ireland is similar. The Irish model is slightly
different because one body handles all types of discrimination complaints
and it offers ADR and adjudication. The Equality Tribunal is a quasi-
judicial specialist body that hears all of Ireland’s discrimination
complaints. It was established so that discrimination cases would not
swamp the general court system. 56 The Tribunal’s objective is to provide
an easily accessible, simple, straightforward forum for hearing discrim-
ination complaints (Equality Tribunal, 2008a: 5). Complainants lodge
their complaint at the Equality Tribunal and the complaint is mediated
unless one party objects. A complainant can request a hearing, referred
to as an ‘investigation’, if mediation is unsuccessful.57 The two processes
are kept separate.58
The direct access model differs from the existing Australian
model in two ways: first, ADR is voluntary. This makes the complaint
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resolution process more flexible. Complainants who want their ‘day in
court’ can start that process without delay, while others, who want to
resolve their complaint quickly and informally, have the option to
attempt to resolve it through conciliation and litigation is available if
that is unsuccessful. The second way that this model varies from the
Australian one is that parties have direct access to the adjudicator. Under
the direct access model, the Equality Commission’s involvement is not
a pre-requisite to litigation and the Equality Commission is not required
to conciliate complaints. Removing the complaint handling and theADR
function from the Equality Commission and offering direct access to
the adjudicator inAustralia would have two significant benefits. First, it
would allow the Equality Commission to concentrate its resources else-
where, such as on enforcement, because it is not preoccupied with
complaint handling and resolution. Second, if the Equality Commission
is not required to handle or conciliate complaints, there is no require-
ment or expectation that it will behave neutrally. Therefore, the Equality
Commission could act as an advocate for the victims of discrimination
and assist complainants without any perceived conflict of interest. The
Equality Commission could choose complaints to assist strategically,
based on whether they would develop the law or enunciate a precedent.59
Amodified version of this model will come into force in Victoria in
August 2011. The complainant will lodge their complaint at the Equality
Commission which will continue to offer conciliation services but will
not investigate the complaint.60 Alternatively, complainants will have
direct access to a general civil administrative tribunal,61 which may
mediate the complaint prior to hearing. Consequently, the Equality
Commission will concentrate its resources on enforcement activities such
as conducting investigations into systemic issues and intervening in rele-
vant cases.62
Improving ADR
LikeAustralia, all of the countries discussed in this article offerADR for
resolving discrimination complaints. The EEOC offers conciliation and
mediation; ACAS in Britain and the Labour Relations Agency in
Northern Ireland provide conciliation services in employment discrimi-
nation matters; the DRC offered non-employment disability
discrimination complainants access to an independent conciliation
service, as does the ECNI; and the Irish Equality Tribunal offers media-
tion. Thus, there is a shared view that the law should provide an
alternative to litigation for resolving discrimination complaints. As
outlined above, the Australian system would be improved if ADR was
voluntary rather than a pre-requisite to court adjudication.
Some of the drawbacks of using conciliation to resolve discrimina-
tion complaints were explored in Part I including that conciliation may
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exacerbate the existing power imbalances between the parties and it is
privatised. Most significantly in the anti-discrimination arena, there is
no guarantee that ADR protects the public’s long-term interest in elimi-
nating discrimination or that it protects the individual’s rights,
particularly if it is used as a case management technique. It was for this
reason that Fiss likenedADR to the civil form of plea bargaining (1984:
1075). After examining how ADR was used to resolve discrimination
complaints in the United States and Australia, Hunter and Leonard
proposed a ‘rights-based’model of conciliation, which attempts to over-
come the problems with the traditional ‘facilitative’ model. Hunter and
Leonard’s conciliation model is described in the first part of this section.
In Britain, the DRC introduced conciliation for non-employment
disability discrimination complaints based on this model. The second
part of this section considers the DRC’s experience with ‘rights-based’
conciliation and outlines why it would be advantageous to use this
approach to resolve discrimination complaints in Australia.
‘Rights-Based’ Conciliation
Hunter and Leonard identified three problems with usingADR to resolve
discrimination complaints, namely privacy, the power imbalance between
the parties and that ADR does not take legal rights into account (1997:
305–310). Hunter and Leonard suggest that if ADR is used to resolve
discrimination disputes, it must reflect the aims of, and ensure compli-
ance with, the legislation (1997: 310). They believe that a ‘rights-based’
approach, as opposed to a facilitative approach, which the Australian
Equality Commissions currently use, is more appropriate for discrimi-
nation complaints. Hunter and Leonard state that the ‘rights-based’
process of resolving discrimination complaints has the following
features: Conciliation is optional, settlements are binding and presump-
tively a matter of public record and Conciliators are responsible for
ensuring the parties are informed of their rights and that the objectives of
the legislation are met through the conciliation process (1997: 311–312).
Under this model, the Conciliator assumes a central role. To do this effec-
tively, Hunter and Leonard state that Conciliators require expertise in
discrimination law and training in conciliating discrimination cases. They
see the Conciliator’s role as requiring more than neutrally facilitating
any agreement reached by the parties. The Conciliator is responsible for
ensuring that the process furthers the objectives of the legislation and
that settlements do not breach the law (1997: 311–312).
Implementing ‘Rights-based’ Conciliation: The DRC
When it established the DRC in 2000, the British government recog-
nised that there was also a need for a conciliation service for
204
IJDL 10-4 29/11/10 13:53 Page 204
non-employment based disability discrimination complaints (O’Brien,
2005: 256). Therefore, unlike the older British Equality Commissions,
the DRC’s founding legislation empowered it to make arrangements for
the provision of conciliation for complaints about goods, facilities and
services, and education.63 The legislation provided that a member
or employee of the DRC could not provide conciliation services,
thereby ensuring that conciliation was kept at arm’s length from the
Commission.64
The DRC established an independent conciliation service, staffed
by outsourced conciliators.65 Conciliations did not take place on the
DRC’s premises.66 Parties were referred to the conciliation service by
the DRC; they could not access it independently.67 Both parties had to
consent to conciliation.68 During its six years in operation, the service
dealt with more than 500 complaints.69 Settlement rates were approxi-
mately 80 percent (Doyle, 2007: 60). The conciliation model that the
DRC introduced bore the hallmarks of Hunter and Leonard’s approach.
The DRC implemented an active, ‘rights-based’ approach to concilia-
tion. O’Brien says that the Commission did this so that it could move
beyond the perceived limits of the conciliation model used by ACAS
(2005: 257). Conciliation at ACAS is similar to conciliation at the
Australian Equality Commissions – Conciliators are facilitators, they do
not take a view of the merits of the complaint and settlements are confi-
dential (Dickens, 2007: 479). By contrast, the key aspects of the DRC’s
‘rights-based’ approach were: participation was voluntary, settlements
were binding and a matter of public record; and Conciliators had
expertise in disability discrimination law and training in conciliating
disability complaints (O’Brien, 2005: 257; Crowther, 2005: 16). The
Conciliator was not ‘hands-off’ and facilitative, nor did they “promote
settlement at any cost” (Doyle, 2007: 60). In keeping with the ‘rights-
based’ approach, the Conciliator took an active role in the resolution
process, promoting discussion and understanding between the parties and
ensuring that each party understood their legal rights and responsibilities.
This approach was not premised on the parties being equal. The DRC
described it as based on:
the fact that rights and obligations exist between them [the parties]... [it]
puts the rights of disabled people as a non-negotiable issue within the
conciliation process. The conciliator must be active in ensuring that the
complainant’s issues are addressed and in suggesting ways for the educa-
tion or service provider to meet their obligations, and be clear about
whether a proposed solution would uphold the complainant’s rights
(Crowther, 2005: 17).
By introducing a ‘rights-based’ approach, the DRC anticipated that the
parties would come to a greater understanding of the issues and circum-
stances which led to the complaint (Doyle, 2007, 60). Reflecting on the
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conciliation service shortly before the DRC closed, Mediator Margaret
Doyle wrote:
I have been surprised at the openness of some very large organisations and
their willingness to accept responsibility for discriminatory behaviour, to
provide redress for the claimant and to make wide-ranging (and sometimes
very costly) changes. I have also been impressed by the very small respon-
dents – the corner shops and family-owned restaurants – who take on board
what they hear at mediation and appreciate the opportunity it gives to learn
more about how they should treat their service users and how they can
keep their custom (2007: 61).
The DRC reported that there were instances when conciliation resulted
in a systemic change. For example, a respondent agreed to make toilet
facilities in a public house accessible to disabled persons.70 A university
agreed to audit its policies, practices and procedures in order to make its
courses and teaching materials more accessible for disabled students.71
Retailer Debenhams agreed to improve disability access to its depart-
ment stores and to make the mezzanine levels in 16 of its stores
accessible to disabled people within six months of the agreement.72 These
outcomes are not available to the court to remedy a disability discrimi-
nation complaint, but the respondent was prepared to agree to them
during conciliation.
Strengths of the ‘Rights-based’Approach
The ‘rights-based’ approach retains all of the advantages of conciliation,
as identified in Part I. It is quick, informal, cost-effective and parties
retain control over the outcome. Most importantly, it addresses three of
the criticisms identified above. First, that conciliation may exacerbate
existing power imbalances between the parties. The ‘rights-based’
approach empowers the Conciliator to play a more active role. The
Conciliator maintains the focus on the complainant’s experience and their
rights and can offset any power imbalance and ensure that one party does
not dominate the discussion. This relates to the second criticism of
conciliation – there is no guarantee that the party’s rights and the law’s
objectives will be upheld. By taking a ‘rights-based’ approach, the
complainant’s rights are central and a focal point of the discussion, rather
than the conciliation process turning into a negotiation about compensa-
tion or a civil plea bargain, as Fiss fears. Further, if the Conciliator plays
an active role and they are charged with ensuring that the law’s objectives
are met and the complainant’s rights are upheld, conciliation is more
likely to result in a systemic outcome. The examples from the DRC show
that this approach to conciliation resulted in changes to the respondent’s
policies and practices, in keeping with the objectives of the legislation.
It is not possible to determine why the respondents in those complaints
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were willing to do more than the court could order them to do. Financial
considerations and avoiding a trial are likely to have played a part. There
is another possible explanation. The respondent may have reached a level
of understanding about the circumstances which led to the complaint and
the effect it had on the complainant. They were thus more willing to take
measures to ensure that the same thing did not happen to another disabled
person. The third criticism of conciliation is that it is confidential, both
its process and outcome, which contributes to the privatisation of
discrimination complaints. The ‘rights-based’ approach addresses this
through the presumption that conciliation agreements are public. This
can be rebutted in circumstances where the parties require their names
and details of the complaint to remain confidential, so it is not a blanket
prohibition on confidentiality and it is flexible enough to meet the parties’
needs.
Increasing the Information Flow about Discrimination
As discussed, there is very little publicly available information about
discrimination settlements in Australia, particularly the outcomes that
the parties negotiated. This is not the situation in other countries: the
Equality Commissions have a policy of disseminating information about
complaints, including those that settle prior to hearing. For example, the
Irish Equality Tribunal publishes information about settlements and hear-
ings as part of its “policy of transparency and accessibility” (2008a: 5).
The ECNI says its aim in publishing an annual compilation of settle-
ments is to raise awareness about unlawful discrimination, illustrate the
issues that may arise out of discriminatory practices and highlight
successful outcomes (2007–2008: 1).
The following overview of the information published in other coun-
tries shows that the lack of available information inAustralia is unusual.
It also shows that publication does not compromise the parties’ privacy:
in many instances, factual information is de-identified.
• The EEOC issues a media release for all of the charges it files and settles
on behalf of complainants, which includes the settlement terms.73
• The ECNI publishes an annual Decisions and Settlements Review. This
includes identified facts and outcomes of all the complaints that the
ECNI assisted during that period.74
• The DRC published the facts and settlement outcomes of conciliated
complaints, identified or anonymous, in a regular Legal Bulletin;75
• The EqualityAuthority publishes identified information about the cases
it assists, including those which are settled, in its Annual Report;
• The Equality Tribunal lists any significant and novel aspects of media-
tion settlements in its annual Mediation Review. Settlements are
described anonymously and without facts;
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• The Equality Tribunal also publishes an annual review of investigated
cases. This publication describes cases relating to each of the prohibited
attributes and areas and those which refer to the fundamental concepts
of equality law.76 Cases are included that deal with issues that are likely
to be relevant and of interest to parties involved in subsequent cases
(2008a: 5).
The information available in these countries has three features in
common: the Equality Commission regularly releases information to the
community about discrimination complaints; information is published
about complaints that settled before hearing, as well as complaints that
were adjudicated; and a description of the facts, anonymous or other-
wise, is included and the negotiated settlement. Increasing the amount of
publicly available information about discrimination complaints in this
way inAustralia would elevate the law out of the private sphere and over-
come one of the key limitations of settlement. This would enhance the
law’s positive ripple effect in the following ways: publishing information
helps to maintain the law’s profile; it is a guide for other complainants
and a deterrent for would-be discriminators; it shows the law ‘in action’;
and it reminds the community that discriminating has consequences.
Against Settlement? OrAgainst Some Settlements?
During the 25 years since Against Settlement was published, scholars
have revisited Fiss’s opposition to settlement, particularly in light of the
growth of ADR in a variety of legal disputes.77 Some have argued that
it is not settlement itself that should be opposed, only some settlements
or, for Luban, the wrong settlements (1994–1995: 2647). The question
that should be asked is not whether to settle but when (Luban, 1994–
1995: 2620; Menkel-Meadow, 1994–1995: 2668). Menkel-Meadow
states:
The more fruitful inquiry is to ask under what circumstance adjudication
is more appropriate than settlement, or vice versa. In short, when settle-
ment? (1985: 498)
A simplistic answer to Menkel-Meadow’s question is that settlement
should be favoured when the case is not likely to develop the law or
secure a precedent. In such instances, ADR should be preferred. The
problem with that response is that it offers no guidance about how to
distinguish these cases or who should be responsible for doing so. In
the context of discrimination complaints, should it be the role of the
judge or court registrar to decide whether a complaint should be concil-
iated or adjudicated? Should it be the parties’ decision or one of the
Equality Commission’s functions? Menkel-Meadow does not think that
it is possible to assign cases to a particular process in advance (1994–
1995: n139) and while Sternlight agrees, she says we must at least
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decide who will make this decision and on what basis (2002-2003: 304).
At present, this is not considered inAustralia. Complaints are subject to
ADR regardless of their precedent value and it is for the parties and their
lawyers to decide whether to resist settlement and go to court.
Modifying the system in the ways considered in Part III would mean
that parties had a choice and could proceed to adjudication if they
desired but this would not stop the ‘wrong’ cases from settling. In
Sternlight’s opinion, the Equality Commission is better suited than the
parties to decide whether a complaint has public as well as private impli-
cations and should be litigated (2004: 1495). In the United States, the
EEOC can litigate on the complainant’s behalf and because it acts in the
public interest, it can still litigate if the complaint has settled (EEOC v
Waffle House Inc 534 US 279 (2002), 286). The Equality Commissions
in the United Kingdom and Ireland can assist complaints to resolve the
dispute, including by funding litigation. Significant decisions from the
European Court of Justice in regard to gender discrimination were estab-
lished this way (Alter and Vargas, 2000). Due to the role that the
Australian Equality Commissions have traditionally played in handling
and resolving complaints, they have not been given this function.78 For
the law to develop and meet its objectives, it is not only necessary to
modify the enforcement structure, the Equality Commission’s functions
also need to be reconsidered.
CONCLUSION
This article explored how using ADR to resolve discrimination
complaints inAustralia has resulted in a system that typifies Fiss’s oppo-
sition to settlement, particularly his concern about the law’s development.
Most complaints are resolved in the privacy of conciliation, with a strict
confidentiality clause; very few are decided through a public hearing.
The effect of this is that the body of case law remains quite small, even
though discrimination has been prohibited for over thirty years.
Modifying the complaint resolution process in the following ways would
address some of these concerns. First, introducing direct access to the
court or tribunal. Second, giving parties the choice of resolving their
complaint using ADR or adjudication. Third, strengthening the current
conciliation model by incorporating a ‘rights-based’ approach. Fourth,
encouraging the Equality Commissions and the courts to publish specific
information about settlements and significant cases regularly as a guide
for potential complainants and to increase community awareness of
discrimination. Instead of typifying Fiss’s concerns with settlement, the
system would strike a balance by recognising that ADR and settlement
are appropriate in some cases but for the law to develop, adjudication
cannot be precluded.
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NOTES
1 The statutory agency is typically identified as the Anti-Discrimination or
Equal Opportunity Commission, Authority or Board. For ease of reference,
‘Equality Commission’ is used throughout to describe the agency.
2 In the States and Territories, a general civil tribunal hears discrimination
cases. The Federal Courts hear federal cases. ‘Tribunal’ and ‘court’ are
used interchangeably throughout except in reference to a specific court
or jurisdiction.
3 The interviews were conducted in 2007 for a larger study, ‘Improving the
Effectiveness of Australia’s Anti-Discrimination Laws’, which was funded
by the Australian Research Council and the Victorian Equal Opportunity
and Human Rights Commission.
4 Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth), s 46PK; Equal
Opportunity Act 1984 (WA), s 88.
5 Human Rights CommissionAct 2001 (ACT), s 55(1) (emphasis in original).
6 National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council, Dispute
Resolution Terms, available at www.nadrac.gov.au/www/nadrac/nadrac.nsf/
Page/What_is_ADRGlossary_of_ADR_Terms (accessed 14/4/10).
7 http://www.humanrights.gov.au/complaints_information/conciliation.html
(accessed 20/5/10).
8 http://www.humanrights.gov.au/complaints_information/infosheet_concil-
iation.html (accessed 20/5/10).
9 Above n7.
10 On conciliation at the AHRC, see Raymond and Georgalis (2002).
11 See eg Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth), s 46PK.
12 See eg Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW), s 91A.
13 See eg Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 (Tas), s 75(4)(b).
14 See eg Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA), s 88.
15 See eg http://www.humanrights.gov.au/complaints_information/concilia-
tion.html (accessed 12/4/10); http://www.adcq.qld.gov.au/Brochures07/
conciliation.html (accessed 12/4/10).
16 Email from Tracey Raymond, Australian Human Rights Commission, to
Dominique Allen, 4 December 2009; Email from Karen Toohey, Victorian
Equal Opportunity and Human Rights Commission, to DominiqueAllen, 23
May 2010. Limited resourcing and the restrictions in the Privacy Act 1988
(Cth) also explain the difficulties that these institutions have with providing
this information. The QueenslandAnti-Discrimination Commission and the
now defunct Anti-Discrimination Tribunal were notable exceptions. Both
institutions permitted the author to examine settlement agreements negotiated
over a calendar year and to extract de-identified data for research purposes.
17 The Federal Court, the New SouthWalesAdministrative Decisions Tribunal,
the Queensland Civil andAdministrative Tribunal, theAnti-Discrimination
Tribunal (Tasmania), the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and
the State Administrative Tribunal (WA) use mediation.
18 The tribunals’ websites discuss mediation in more detail. In New South
Wales, mediation is conducted by a tribunal member. In Victoria and
Queensland, mediation is conducted by a tribunal member, a registrar or a
trained mediator. In federal matters, a registrar usually conducts mediation.
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19 Unless the Equality Commission declines the complaint, in which case the
complainant may lodge the complaint at the tribunal where the respondent
may apply to strike out the complaint or it may be referred to mediation.
20 The complaint data is drawn from the Equality Commissions’ 2006–2007
annual reports and tribunal decisions in 2007: Victorian Equal Opportunity
and Human Rights Commission (2006/2007); Victorian Civil and
Administrative Tribunal (2006–07); Anti-Discrimination Commission
Queensland (2006/07); Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission
(2006/2007); Federal Magistrates Court of Australia (2006/2007). Due to
the variations in the way the Equality Commissions and court record infor-
mation, this data has some limitations, which are not applicable to this
discussion (See further Allen, 2009: 779–780).
21 It is not possible to express this as a percentage. The Commission’s annual
report implies that this refers to all types of complaints, not only discrimi-
nation complaints.
22 This is the applications relating to discrimination matters which were filed
at the Federal Magistrates Court, which represented 1.3% of applications.
23 34 discrimination matters were referred to mediation. Of all federal law
matters which were mediated, more than 50% resolved.
24 See comments from lawyers about the costs of litigation in Allen (2009:
786–788).
25 Equal Opportunity Act 1995 (Vic), s 65.
26 Although this is a process of negotiation and it is influenced by many factors
including economic ones, such as the legal fees that the parties are incurring
(Allen, 2009: 786–788).
27 The AHRC does not publish information on the respondents’ representa-
tion. Empirical studies of discrimination complaints have examined
representation across various jurisdictions (Charlesworth, 2008: Table 115;
Hunter and Leonard, 1995: 4–5; Gaze, 2000: 126)
28 Gonzalez and McCabe (2003: 9) note that lawyers change “the dynamics”
of conciliation of discrimination complaints. They suggest that this is
because they are used to operating in an adversarial model and this may
create a hostile environment. Further, since they need to cover their costs,
they may also be inclined to seek financial settlements.
29 See eg Equal Opportunity Act 1995 (Vic), s 116.
30 A term Thornton uses (1995: 83).
31 Fiss also criticises ADR on this basis (1984: 1075).
32 In its 2008–2009Annual Report, the Commission noted that in the previous
five years, the success rate for resolving complaints at conciliation had
increased by 26 percent (2008–2009: 17).
33 Fiss (2009) traces the genesis of his opposition to settlement to his experi-
ence working in school desegregation cases.
34 An example Fiss provides is school desegregation cases, some of which had
continued for 20 years, such as Brown v. Board of Education 84 FRD 383
(D. Kan. 1979) in which the child of one of the plaintiffs in the original
Brown case sought to intervene on behalf of a class of students.
35 The following year, the Supreme Court considered the implementation of its
original decision. The case was returned to the District Court with the
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requirement that the plaintiffs were admitted to public schools on a non-
discriminatory basis ‘with all deliberate speed’: 349 US 294 (1955), 757.
36 On the reasons parties in Victoria settle complaints, see further Allen (2009:
786–789). For a discussion of the federal jurisdiction, see Gaze and Hunter
(2009: 709).
37 This is the practice of the AHRC and the Queensland Anti-Discrimination
Commission, for example.
38 A recent review of the Equal OpportunityAct 1995 (Vic) recommended that
the Equality Commission should collate and disseminate de-identified settle-
ment outcomes (Department of Justice (Vic), 2008: Recommendation 33).
Amendments to the Act will allow the Equality Commission to disclose
information about complaints if it is de-identified or already in the public
domain or the parties have consented to the disclosure, subject to limita-
tions imposed by other laws in regard to the collection of information and
provided that the information is disclosed for the purpose of the Equality
Commission’s educative function: Equal OpportunityAct 2010 (Vic), s 177.
39 It is an objective of the laws in Victoria, the Australian Capital Territory,
Queensland, the Northern Territory and Western Australia.
40 Unlike other countries, Australia has a relatively weak regulatory regime
for addressing discrimination. See further Smith (2006: from 723).
41 See Table 1 above.
42 The low number of decided cases is not recent: it characterises the legisla-
tion’s history in many Australian jurisdictions (Allen, 2009: 781–782).
43 Gerhardy v Brown (1985) 57 ALR 472; Australian Iron & Steel v Banovic
(1989) 168 CRL 165; Waters v Public Transport Corporation (1991) 173
CLR 349; IW v Perth (1997) 191 CLR 1; X v Commonwealth (1999) 200
CLR 177; Purvis v New South Wales [2003] 217 CLR 92 and New South
Wales v Amery (2006) 226 ALR 196.
44 See similar concerns expressed in Rees et al (2008: 28).
45 Waters v Public Transport Corporation, IW v Perth, X v Commonwealth
and Purvis v New South Wales: above n43
46 Gerhardy v Brown: above n43.
47 Ibid.
48 On public, private and procedural interests in anti-discrimination law, see
further Sternlight (2004: from 1483).
49 For a comparative analysis see eg O’Cinneide (2002); Hepple et al (2000);
Coussey (2002); Sternlight (2004); Chi-hye Suk (2006).
50 The EEOC enforces Title VII of the Civil Rights Act; the Age
Discrimination in EmploymentAct of 1967, 29 USC §633a and Titles I and
V of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 42 USC §§ 12101.
51 A complaint.
52 Civil RightsAct, s 706(b). Conciliation is facilitated by an EEOC employee:
(Sternlight, 2004: 1415). It is separate from the enforcement unit and the
legal staff: Interview with Lisa Sirkin, Supervisory Trial Attorney, EEOC
(New York City, 12 September 2007).
53 Mediated charges take almost half as long as other forms of EEOC resolu-
tion (Miller, (2001: 20). For the history of the program, see
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/mediation/history.cfm (accessed 20/5/10).
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Settlement constitutes the final resolution of the charge and is enforceable
by the EEOC. If the parties do not settle, the charge will either be returned
for investigation or the EEOC will dismiss it, giving the complainant the
option to litigate: Civil Rights Act, s 706(2)(f).
54 A separate section of the EEOC administers mediation. It is staffed by a
combination of mediators employed by the EEOC and contractors. Some
field offices also use volunteer mediators: Interview with Professor Rick
Rossein, School of Law, City University of New York (New York City, 12
September 2007); Sirkin, above n52.
55 If the EEOC decides not to proceed with the complaint it issues a ‘notice of
right to sue’ so the complainant can file the charge in court. If the EEOC is
taking too long to investigate, the complainant can bypass the EEOC process
and commence litigation immediately by requesting the EEOC to close the
case and issue a notice of right to sue. On average, it takes 180 days after
filing to close the case and issue a notice of right to sue. In practice, due to
the backlog of charges, it is easy to request a right to sue letter and most
complainants are issued with one: Interview with Professor Rosalie
Levinson, Valparaiso Law School (Valparaiso, 6 September 2007).
56 The enforcement unit and legal staff are separate from the conciliation staff:
Sirkin, above n52.
57 The Tribunal keeps the two processes separate: see below n64.
58 Employment Equality Act 1998–2004 (“EEA(I)”), s 78; Equal Status Act
2000–2004 (“ESA(I)”), s 24.
59 From 2002–2007, the DRC provided an outsourced conciliation service for
non-employment complaints, as discussed further below. When the EHRC
commenced operation, it took over this function and now offers ‘rights-
based’ conciliation services in Britain. Based on the DRC’s success, the
ECNI also introduced a conciliation service for non-employment disability
complaints in September 2007: Interview with Mary Kitson, Senior Legal
Officer, Equality Commission for Northern Ireland (Belfast, 25 September
2007). See the Equality (Disability Etc.) (Northern Ireland) Order 2000,
Art 12.
60 In Britain, when a discrimination complaint is filed at the Employment
Tribunal, ACAS is automatically sent a copy of the complaint and it has a
duty to offer to settle it through conciliation. The process is similar in
Northern Ireland. See further Susson and Taylor (2006: 29).
61 See http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/our-job/what-we-do/ (accessed
20/5/10).
62 As described below, the Victoria legislation was recently amended in this
way but it does not come into force until August 2011.
63 The exception is the DRC’s conciliation service, discussed below. The new
EHRC now offers conciliation services: above n61.
64 Interview with Bernadette Treanor, Equality Officer, Equality Tribunal
(Dublin, 27 September 2007).
65 Most unsuccessful complainants request this: Treanor, above n64. The medi-
ator issues a non-resolution notice and the complainant has 28 days to apply
for the complaint to be investigated: see eg ESA(I), s 24(6)(b). In 2008, 68%
of the 157 complaints referred to mediation were settled (Equality Tribunal,
2008b: 11–12).
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66 A staff member who has a dual role as an Equality Mediation Officer and an
Equality Officer will not perform both functions for the same complaint.
The information provided at mediation is not available to the investigating
Equality Officer: Treanor, ibid.
67 Eg the DRC engaged in strategic enforcement during its existence. See
further O’Brien (2005).
68 Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic), s 113(1).
69 Ibid s 122.
70 Ibid Part 9.
71 Those under Parts III and IV of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995
(“DDA(UK)”) respectively. The Disability Rights Commission Act 1999
(UK) (“DRCA”), s 10 empowers the DRC to arrange conciliation of Part III
complaints and the Special Educational Needs and DisabilityAct 2001 (UK)
extends this to Part IV complaints. The legislation describes the process as
‘conciliation’ but the DRC saw it is as more like ‘mediation’ (Doyle, 2007:
57). For ease of comparison, conciliation is used herein.
72 DRCA, s 10(3).
73 For the first year, the Disability Access Rights Advice Service handled
conciliation. From March 2001, Mediation UK, a registered charity and
community based service, was contracted to run the Disability Conciliation
Service (O’Brien, 2005: 256). The DRC’s literature refers to the facilitators
as ‘mediators’, despite referring to the service as ‘conciliation’.
74 The Disability Conciliation Service tried to arrange meetings in person and
at the nearest neutral accessible venue to the complainant’s home (Crowther,
2005: 20).
75 To determine if a complaint was appropriate for conciliation some of the
factors the DRC considered were whether the complainant met the
DDA(UK)’s definition of ‘disabled’, when the incident took place, the age
of the complainant, and whether conciliation was the best way to proceed
(Crowther, 2005: 18).
76 Interview with Nick O’Brien, Director of Legal Services, Disability Rights
Commission (Phone interview, London, 21 September 2007).
77 The British courts do not classify discrimination complaints, so it is not
possible to know what proportion this represents of the total number of cases
(Doyle, 2007: 60).
78 Kirwan v Spirit Group Limited, trading as Shirley Inn [2006]. Reported in
Disability Rights Commission (2007: 124).
79 Chan v Bradford University [2004]. Reported in Disability Rights
Commission (2007: 125).
80 Jackson v Debenhams P/c [2006]. Reported in Disability Rights
Commission (2007: 125).
81 See http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/ (accessed 20/5/10).
82 It is the ECNI’s policy not to agree to confidentiality for those complaints
it assists. Other parties are free to agree to confidential settlements. It is for
this reason that all the complaints which appear in this publication are iden-
tified.
83 See eg facts and outcomes of conciliated complaints discussed in Crowther
(2005: 21–22) and facts of settled and litigated complaints in Disability
Rights Commission (2007: 116).
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84 Eg four cases that considered the burden of proof were highlighted in
Equality Tribunal (2006: 93–94).
85 See eg academic papers from a symposium evaluating Against Settlement
after 25 years: (2009) 78 Fordham Law Review.
86 I have argued elsewhere that the Australian Equality Commission should
be able to engage in enforcement activities, including assisting complainants
and litigating complaints: (Allen, 2009: 795; Allen, 2010b).
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